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Abstract— A real-time optimal dispatch method for 
unbundled electricity markets is proposed in this paper. With 
this method, pool energy auction market, ancillary services 
market, and bilateral contract market can be coordinated by 
the ISO through a balancing market for the purpose of system 
security. To meet real-time imbalance and to eliminate 
transmission congestion, operating reserves, curtailment of 
bilateral contracts, and supplemental energy bids in the real-
time balancing market (REM), can all be called upon in light of 
their bidding prices. The replacement of the operating reserves 
used to provide balancing energy is incorporated into the 
objective of the real-time optimal dispatch problem. A modified 
P-Q decoupled optimal power flow (OPF) is employed to 
implement this method. Spot pricing for the real-time dispatch 
is presented. The IEEE 30-bus test system is studied to 
illustrate the proposed framework. 
Index Terms-Ancillary services, balancing market, bilateral 
contract, congestion management, coordinated dispatch, 
optimal power flow (OPF), deregulation, energy market. 
I. INTRODUCTION
OWEVER , the problem still remaining for an ISO to              
resolve is how to use all the possible resources during 
the real-time execution of various electricity commodity 
contracts efficiently and coordinately to ensure the system 
security. The main difficulties occurring in this real-time 
coordinated dispatch problem could be: 
• how to dispatch the agreed system reserves contracts
together with the supplemental energy bids in the 
balancing market; 
• with the trend that more and more bilateral contracts are
used to trade electricity, how to eliminate network 
congestion if the resources in the balancing market are not 
enough; 
• To maintain the system security level, how to purchase
replacement operating reserves if any of the pre-arranged 
operating reserves are called upon to provide energy for 
real-time system balancing or congestion management 
[2]. 
To resolve these difficulties, a new framework for real-
time dispatch of unbundled electricity markets is proposed in 
this article. Under this framework, almost all the contracts in 
various markets can be dispatched and coordinated by 
submitting their adjustment bids to the balancing market. In 
particular, some bilateral contracts can be adjusted if the 
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congestion of the network is very serious [3, 4]. Demand 
side participants are encouraged to play an active role in the 
competition of the real-time balancing market. A modified 
P-Q decoupled OPF is applied to solve this problem. The 
objective of the P sub-problem is to coordinate the dispatch 
among the pool auction contracts, the bilateral contracts and 
some operating reserve contracts, in accordance with the 
cost which is determined by the bids submitted by these 
contracts to the balancing market. The spot pricing and the 
two possible settlement methodologies are analyzed as well. 
A 5-bus test system and the IEEE 30-bus test system are 
studied to illustrate the proposed framework and its 
mathematical solution. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF REAL-TIME COORDINATED DISPATCH
Real-time Balancing Market and Coordinated Dispatch 
(RBM) play a key role in real-time operation of electricity 
markets. In RBM the ISO is responsible for dispatching all 
the available resources to meet imbalances between actual 
and scheduled load and generation and alleviate network 
congestion. The ISO will select the least cost resources to 
meet these imbalances. In addition, the ISO may also need to 
purchase replacement ancillary services if any services 
arranged in advance are used to provide balancing energy 
[2]. The purpose of RBM is to establish a fully open market-
based mechanism for all the market participants to take part 
in the real-time competition. In RBM, all the generators and 
consumers can submit to the ISO their incremental and 
decremental bids for providing balancing energy and their 
capacity bids for the replacement of operating reserves 
which are used as balancing energy. In the NETA of the UK 
market, these incremental/decremental bids are called “pairs 
of offer and bid”. Because the ISO does not know the price 
information of bilateral contracts and the modification of a 
bilateral contract could involve both sides of a contract, it is 
very difficult to find a proper way to change them for the 
purpose of reducing transmission congestion. One method is 
that both parties submit their own supplemental bids in RBM 
separately, just like the other participants in the pool. The 
ISO does not take into account the content of the bilateral 
contract during settlement. However, in the event of a high 
percentage of bilateral contracts not producing enough 
voluntary supplemental bids from them or both parties of a 
bilateral contract are willing to be curtailed by the same 
amount to simplify the settlement, other methods are needed. 
In the proposed framework, every bilateral contract should 
submit a sort of compensative price that both parties of the 
contract are willing to accept if the curtailment needs to be 
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imposed by the ISO during congestion periods. In 
accordance with such information, the ISO can reduce the 
scheduled bilateral contract if the other available resources 
in RBM are not enough to eliminate the congestion. 
Fig.1. Typical contracts associated with a generator at bus i and their 
adjustment bids to RBM 
In Fig 1, 
i,j Index of network buses. 
0
iP  Scheduled MW generation of generator or
MW load of consumer at bus i. 
ij
iP Total MW amount of bilateral contracts 
between buses i and j.
min
iP ,
max
iP  Low and high limit of MW at bus i either for 
generator or for consumer. 
s
iP
Re Operating reserves procured by ISO from 
participant at bus i in ancillary services 
market. 
+Δ iP ,
−Δ iP  Incremental and decremental MW changes 
of participant at bus i in real-time balancing 
market.
ij
iPΔ Curtailment of bilateral contract between 
buses i and j.
s
iP
ReΔ Operating reserves called upon by ISO in the 
real-time balancing market out of siP
Re .
p
iP
ReΔ Reserves at bus i procured by ISO in real-
time balancing market to replace the used 
operating reserves. 
+
ib ,
−
ib  Incremental and decremental bidding prices 
of participant at bus i in RBM ($/MW). 
ij
ib  Compensative price for the curtailment of 
bilateral contract between buses i and j 
($/MW). 
En
ib  Bidding price of the energy output from 
s
iP
Re  ($/MW). 
p
ib
Re Bidding price to provide piP
ReΔ at bus i
($/MW).
Some typical contracts of active power associated with a 
generator at bus i and their bids submitted to the ISO in 
RBM are shown in Fig.1, in which the adjustment of 
generation at bus i is divided into four separate parts based 
on three unbundled electricity contracts.  
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK
A modified P-Q decoupled OPF is applied to implement 
the proposed framework. Both P- and Q sub-problems are 
presented, and the P sub-problem is analyzed in more detail. 
Before the trade period, the schedules of unbundled markets 
should have been established. The principle of the balancing 
mechanism is to follow the schedules as close as possible 
and to minimize the cost of real-time dispatch. After 
linearization at the scheduled operating point, the model of 
real-time coordinated optimal dispatch can be written in 
following sections. 
IV. P SUB-PROBLEM
A. Objective
To make the settlement of unbundled markets clear and 
simple, the objective of real-time active power dispatch can 
be decomposed into four parts. 
Min  4321 ppppp CCCCC +++=          (1) 
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The total cost for the adjustment of PEAM contracts 
whose supplemental bids are accepted in RBM. But for 
accepted decremental bids, the participants can not get any 
payment for this part of reduced energy from the ISO in 
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is the cost of reserves re-procured by ISO in RBM to 
replace the used operating reserves. In the event of an 
unscheduled increase in system load, the ISO will be 
required to purchase additional reserves. In addition, if any 
of the pre-arranged operating reserves are used to meet a 
real-time imbalance, the ISO will be required to purchase 
replacement operating reserves. The reserve market and the 
balancing energy market will be still settled separately. 
Embedding the cost of replacement of operating reserves in 
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global optimal solution. It can be regarded as the real-time 
joint dispatch of energy and reserves. 
Obviously, the objective is to minimize the modification 
on all the scheduled contracts in light of the associated 
dispatch cost. +Δ iP ,
−Δ iP ,
ij
iPΔ ,
s
iP
ReΔ and piP
ReΔ are treated 
as independent control variables during the optimization 
process. But their upper/lower limits are coupled with each 
other. All the bidding curves could be multi-step. The 
incremental bidding price is higher than decremental bidding 
price while the curtailment price of bilateral contracts is 
much higher than the other two. The reason is that increasing 
output needs more fuel cost and the curtailment to a bilateral 
contract will affect the financial interests of both parties. 
B. Equality Constraints 
The equation below is the nodal active power flow 
balance equation of bus i:
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Where G is the set of buses connected with generators, C
is the set of buses connected with consumers, n is the total 
number of network buses, s is the index of the slack bus, 'ijB
is an element of matrix B′  which is the inverse reactance of 
branch ij. LossiPΔ  Is the summed change of losses on 
branches that are connected to bus i and flows on the 
branches are flowing to bus i. Using the piece-wise linear 
loss model. 
The requirement of re-procurement to replace used 
operating reserves is given by 
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i PP Re
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Where α  is decided by the ISO according to how many 
new operating reserves are procured to compensate for the 
used reserves in real-time dispatch. 10 ≤≤ α .
C. Inequality Constraints 
The changing ranges of the various control variables are 
given by 
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The constraint for real power flow change on branch l.
D. Pricing for Real-Time Active Power Dispatch 
From (6), we can have the system active power balance 
equation as: 
0
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Where iPΔ  is the total change of active power at bus i and 
LossPΔ  is the total change of active power losses. 
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Using the theory of spot pricing [1, 5], the LMP of a 
participant (either a generator or a consumer) at bus i is: 
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Shown in equation (14), the real-time spot price at bus i
can be decomposed into three parts: the system lambda, the 
active power losses and the congestion management cost. 
From equation (15), we can have different forms of Piρ at
bus i at which the participant has made some contribution to 
the real-time dispatch. 
E. Meeting Real-Time Imbalance of Market under 
Normal Operating Conditions 
Providing there is no serious contingency, the operating 
reserves and the supplemental energy in RBM should be 
enough to follow the system load fluctuation. The 
curtailment of bilateral contracts and load shedding are not 
necessary in this case. To model this problem, the objective 
in (1) should be rewritten as: 
Min 421 pppp CCCC ++=            (16) 
And all the constraints of ijiPΔ  should be removed. 
Given the system load fluctuation sysPΔ , the bus load 
change can be expressed as: 
sys
ii PBL Δ= η     (17) 
Where iη  is a bus load allocation factor, 1=¦
∈Ci
iη .
To meet this system imbalance, the right hand side of 
equation (6) changes to iBL  from 0. Considering that rapid 
response generation units are enough to meet the normal 
system imbalance, to reduce the number of control variables, 
the nodal active power balance equations (6) for pure load 
buses can be rewritten as: 
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And the system balance equation (13) can be changed to: 
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Without any branch limit violation, the LMP at bus i is: 
λλρ
i
Loss
P
i
P
P
Δ∂
Δ∂
−=              (20) 
F. Replacement of Operating Reserves 
From equation (19), the marginal price of the replacement 
of operating reserves is: 
++= i
pp μμρ ReRe       (21) 
The cost of replacement of operating reserves affects the 
LMPs through the item pReαμ instead of appearing in the 
equation (14) or (20) directly. 
Calling up energy from operating reserves during real-
time dispatch, the ISO must pay for not only the energy but 
also the procurement of the reserve replacement. Therefore, 
if the supplemental energy in RBM is fast and cheap enough, 
the reserve contracts signed in PAAM could be left 
unchanged. As a result, the real-time balancing mechanism 
expands the concept of operating reserves and gives market 
participants more competitive opportunities. 
G. Curtailment of Bilateral Contracts 
According to the characteristics of bilateral contract, the 
curtailment should be done to both parties of the contract as 
has been discussed above.  
But sometimes the load in a bilateral contract is too 
important to be curtailed or the response of the generation 
unit in a bilateral contract is not fast enough to decrease its 
output to mitigate the network congestion. In these two 
cases, the energy imbalance caused by single side 
curtailment will be taken by the other available resources in 
RBM. Here, the partner of a bilateral contract without 
curtailment will not get the compensation payment from the 
ISO. On the contrary, this participant must pay for the 
dispatch cost for this imbalance. Then the equation (23) has 
another form as: 
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V. Q SUB-PROBLEM
The Q Sub-problem of real-time coordinated optimal 
dispatch can be formulated as: 
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where +iw and −iw are the reactive power incremental and 
decremental bidding prices of participant i in RBM 
respectively, +Δ iQ  and −Δ iQ  are its increasing output and 
decreasing output of reactive power respectively, 0iQ , miniQ ,
max
iQ  are its current reactive power output or load, 
minimum reactive power and maximum reactive power 
respectively. T is the number of transformers, whose tap 
positions are adjustable, in the system. +Δ kt  and 
−Δ kt  are the 
increasing tap ratio and the decreasing tap ratio of 
transformer k. kr  is the bidding price for the adjustment of 
tap positions of transformer k if there are any independent 
transmission companies and the transmission sector is also 
competitive. maxmin0 ,, kkk ttt  are the current tap ratios, the 
minimum and maximum tap ratios of transformer k,
respectively. iVΔ  is the change of the voltage magnitude at 
bus i, 0iV , miniV and maxiV  are its current value, lower limit 
and upper limit. ijB ′′  is an element of the matrix B ′′ .
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
To solve the problem fast and reliably, an AC Power Flow 
and a Primal-dual Interior Point (IP) Linear Programming 
(LP) are used to implement the above OPF algorithm. The 
procedure of the decoupled OPF implemented in this article 
is as follows: 
Step1: Run the AC Power Flow to get the initial state of 
power system; 
Step2: Compute the necessary sensitivities and linearize 
the constraints; 
Step3: Select the control variables of LP according to the 
bids in RBM. Decide if the bilateral contract curtailment is 
needed and which curtailment strategy should be used; 
Step4: Run LP to solve P sub-problem; 
Step5: Run LP to solve Q sub-problem; 
Step6: Correct the control variables, and then run AC 
Power Flow to get the new state of power system; 
Step7: Check if all the constraints have been satisfied. If 
yes, continue; if no, go to step2; 
Step8: Obtain the optimal coordinated dispatch strategy. 
VII. SIMULATION
Two test systems are studied to illustrate the proposed 
method. The IEEE 30-bus test system is studied to show 
how the real-time coordinated optimal dispatch works and 
the LMPs obtained from it. Finally, a computational 
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comparison between the Simplex LP method and Interior 
Point LP method is performed to show the efficiency of the 
latter. The IEEE 30-bus system is used here to illustrate the 
proposed coordinated dispatch method. The various bids of 
participants, including generators, consumers and bilateral 
contracts, are given in Table I, 
TABLE I THE BIDS OF PARTICIPANTS IN RBM 
In which G-1 means generator at bus 1 and C-24 means 
consumer at bus 24.  
A. Coordinated Dispatch without Network Congestion 
Assume that there is a 100MW increase on system load, 
which has been distributed to individual buses according to 
their current load shares. Set 1=α , then the obtained 
optimal dispatch strategy to meet this load fluctuation is 
shown in Table II, Fig. 2 reveals the two components of 
LMPs under normal operating conditions, which are system 
lambda and network losses. 
TABLE II THE OPTIMAL DISPATCH STRATEGY TO MEET THE LOAD 
FLUCTUATION
Fig.2. Components of spot prices under normal operating condition 
eliminate this light congestion with meeting the given load 
change is shown in Table III. 
In this case, three components of the LMP given in 
Equation (14), which are system lambda, network losses and 
congestion management are illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The cost of replacement of used operating reserves is not 
a component of LMPs in Equation (28). However, it can 
affect the value of system lambda. Fig.7 demonstrates the 
change of LMPs under different replacement Procurement of 
used operating reserves by giving 0=α , 5.0=α , 1=α .
B. Coordinated Dispatch with Network Congestion 
Case 1: Based on the same load fluctuation and the same 
operating reserves replacement level ( 1=α ) as those in last 
section, the active power flow on line 36 (from bus-28 to 
bus-27) is 24.79MW. Now reduce the limit of active power 
flow on this line to 24MW, the optimal dispatch strategy to 
Fig.3. Effects of different replacement procurement of operating reserves on 
LMPs 
TABLE III THE OPTIMAL DISPATCH STRATEGY WITH ACTIVE POWER FLOW 
VIOLATION ON LINE 36. 
Compared with Fig. 2, the spot prices in Fig. 4 have not 
changed a lot at most buses except buses 25-27, 29-30. 
That means these several buses have higher sensitivity to 
the congested line 36 than the other buses. In other word, the 
consumers at these buses should pay most of the cost caused 
by network congestion. Because the congestion is very 
slight, the associated Lagrangian multiplier 21.2max36 −=μ is
not terribly big. 
Case 2: Based on the same operating condition as in case 
1, but the congestion branch in this case is line 18. (From 
bus-12 to bus-15), whose base active power flow is 
22.67MW. Now reduce the limit of active power flow on 
this line to 19MW because of an unexpected contingency, 
the optimal dispatch strategy to eliminate this congestion 
with meeting the given load change is shown in Table IV. 
From Table 4 it can be noticed that this network congestion 
is so serious that the decremental bids of G-13 is still not 
enough to eliminate it. Some transaction in bilateral contract 
B1 has to be curtailed. The cost of this curtailment can not 
be embedded into the defined spot prices. It must be 
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allocated to market participants separately. 
Fig.4. Components of spot prices with network congestion 
TABLE IV THE OPTIMAL DISPATCH STRATEGY WITH ACTIVE POWER FLOW 
VIOLATION ON LINE 18. 
Fig.5. Spot prices for congestion management with bilateral contract 
curtailment 
To demonstrate it, we change the curtailment strategy of 
bilateral contract to only decreasing the generation while 
keeping the load supplied by other available resources in 
RBM. The comparison of spot prices between these two 
situations is given in Fig.5. Compared with Fig.4 the 
fluctuation of spot prices in Fig.5 is very large, which means 
the congestion in this case is very serious. The price at bus 
15 is prohibitively high because the consumer at bus 15 is 
the main cause of this congestion. Another phenomenon that 
should be noticed in Fig. 5 is that the spot prices at buses 12 
and 13 are negative. Negative price at bus-13 means that 
decremental or bilateral curtailment bids from G-13 must 
have been accepted by the ISO to eliminate the network 
congestion. Negative price at bus-12 implies that L-12 can 
get payment in RBM from increasing its load since this 
action could be helpful to alleviate the congestion. 
Case 3: Voltage limits violation. Change the active load at 
bus 26 from 3.5 MW to 33.5 MW. As a result, the voltage at 
bus 26 decreases to 0.82 p.u. and violates the lower limit 
0.85 p.u. Reactive congestion management is run to 
eliminate the voltage violation. Fig. 6 shows the nodal prices 
of reactive power, which are the shadow prices of the nodal 
reactive power balancing equality constraints of the Q sub-
problem. It is obvious that the reactive power price at bus 6 
is prohibitively high. This penalty is reasonable, because the 
voltage violation is caused by the heavy active load at bus 
26. This price signal also implies a planning requirement
that some reactive power compensation devices should be 
installed at or near this spot. 
Fig.10 Effects of voltage violation on nodal prices 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, a coordinated real-time optimal dispatch 
method for unbundled electricity markets has been proposed. 
The main features of this method are the following: 
Three types of electricity contracts, which are bilateral 
energy contract, Pool energy auction contract and ancillary 
services contract, have been taken into account in the 
coordinated dispatch; 
Balancing mechanism plays the key role in the proposed 
framework, where the ISO can meet the system imbalance 
and mitigate the network congestion by using various bids; 
The adjustment of bus injection has been divided into 
several independent control variables according to 
unbundled contracts to embed all the possible bids in RBM 
into the objective of active power optimization; 
The curtailment strategies of bilateral contracts have been 
integrated into the proposed method; 
Test results demonstrate that the proposed coordinated 
dispatch method implemented with a modified OPF can deal 
with the system imbalance and network congestion 
simultaneously and successfully. 
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